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Abstract: 
Classroom discussion of political topics, if done in a way that encourages lively but healthy 
debate, can encourage student participation and critical thinking. This paper outlines several 
insights from public choice research as applied to the federal government set up by the U.S. 
Constitution and the protection of property rights. Using a Hobbes versus Locke framework, 
this discussion also encourages debate about the role of government generally. The 
interdisciplinary nature of the discussion encourages input from students majoring in various 
fields, making this framework particularly well suited to use in an upper division elective with 
limited pre-requisite courses. 
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Introduction 
The writings of two 17
th
 century political philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke, offer a useful framework for classroom discussion of the role of government, especially 
as it applies to property rights. Hobbes (1651) and Locke (1689) differ greatly in their 
approach to rights and the proper role of government. The current U.S. federal system is a 
mixture of the Lockean and Hobbesian approaches with an increasing shift toward a 
Hobbesian based system. This paper analyzes the structure of the U.S. government within that 
framework. Public choice
2
 pressures on various players in the three branches of government 
and legal cases provide material for engaging classroom discussions.
3
  
Under the Lockean approach to rights, all rights precede government.  The people 
voluntarily join together to emerge from the uncertainty of the state of nature into civil society.  
By consenting to grant certain rights to a government restricted to specific functions, man is 
better able to protect his property. Property, for Locke, is defined broadly to include all the 
natural rights of an individual. Locke’s theory of property is founded on the notion that every 
man has property in his own person and whatever he removes from the state of nature by 
mixing his labor with it becomes his property as long as there is enough left for others, a 
consideration not binding in early times. The nature of the grant of rights requires that the 
                                                 
1
  Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Accounting, Finance & Economics, 
Austin Peay State University, P.O. Box 4416, Clarksville, TN 37044.  
2
  Public Choice: the study of “the economics of politics … to understand and to predict 
the behavior of political markets by utilizing the analytical techniques of economics, most 
notably the rational choice postulate, in the modeling of non-market decision-making 
behavior.” (Rowley 2004, p3)  
3
  Founding contributions to the public choice literature that are of particular relevance 
to this discussion include Black (1948), Arrow (1950), Downs (1957), and Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962). Olson (1965) extended the analysis of interest group behavior by using the 
rational choice model. 
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government, as fiduciary, serve and protect the people. Property is safe from arbitrary seizure 
by government. The existence of a common judge is necessary to place men within civil 
society; however, men must give up more than simply the right to punish transgressors. An 
effective government must have the sole right to interpret and execute civil laws. Man retains 
his natural rights, not least the natural right to property, though the common judge may 
adjudicate disputes over rights.   
The Hobbesian approach to rights gives deference to the sovereign.  To escape the state 
of nature and achieve peace, man must subject himself to the unlimited power of Leviathan 
and holds no rights, except the right to life, which are independent of him. The sovereign is 
established through a social contract and can be a political system, not necessarily one 
individual. Competing uses of resources drive demands for the establishment of rights. The 
Hobbesian notion that individuals must hand over all rights to Leviathan implies that rights 
derive by grant from the sovereign. When there are no property rights that are independent of 
government, man relies on the whim of Leviathan for the security of his property and has no 
assurances against arbitrary interferences.  
The implications of the Hobbesian approach differ markedly from the Lockean civil 
society.  When property rights derive from the sovereign, as in the Hobbesian approach, it is 
not necessary to gain the consent of the property owner to infringe on those rights. Instead of 
negotiating to achieve contractual solutions, the battle is played out in the political system. 
Those who wish to achieve a redistribution of rights in their favor must seek the approval and 
assistance of those in power. Rent seeking
4
 tends to drive property rights allocations, and those 
with greater political influence win the prize. Economic decisions regarding the best uses of 
resources are based on political influence instead of the demands of producers and consumers.
5
  
Lobbying by companies, special interests and other well-organized groups aims to gain 
the benefits of the exertion of government power at the expense of those who are less 
organized (Olson 1965).
6
 In addition to physical takings of property, well-organized groups 
lobby for special treatment or protection from competition. For example, rent-seeking sugar 
producers in the United States enjoy special protection from foreign competition through 
tariffs. The American consumer and industries using sugar to produce candy and other 
products must pay more for sugar (Riley and Andel 2014). Sugar industry supporters claim the 
program benefits American consumers and taxpayers (Sanchez 2017). Most Americans are 
                                                 
4
  Rent seeking: the socially costly pursuit of wealth transfers through government.  
5
  A substantial literature exists; however, a few authors serve as the foundation of 
research in this area. Tullock (1967) introduced the concept of rent seeking. Krueger (1974) 
coined the term and provided an early theoretical analysis and estimates of the costs of rent 
seeking. Posner (1975) provided the first empirical paper on rent seeking. Buchanan (1980) 
and Rowley, et al. (1988) influenced research in the area.  
6
  Olson’s views and the resulting implications have been challenged by the Chicago 
School, especially Becker (1983) and Wittman (1989, 1995).  
3 |  J O U R N A L  F O R  E C O N O M I C  E D U C A T O R S ,  1 7 ( 2 ) ,  2 0 1 7
  
3 
 
unaware of programs such as the US policy on sugar
7
 and the calls for protection of other 
industries, such as the steel industry.
8
 
 Outright transfers of property and regulatory limitations on the use of property work 
similarly to interfere with the owner’s rights and alter economic decisions. In addition to the 
resources diverted to lobbying efforts, productivity is further hampered by the reduction of 
incentives that result from a world without secure property rights.
9
 Those who wind up bearing 
the burden will not work as hard when they cannot be certain that they will be able to keep the 
fruits of their effort.   
Within the framework of limited government envisioned by Locke, judicial deference 
to the legislature or the executive undermines the role of the judiciary and alters the nature of 
competition. Although this proposition was at least mildly controversial among Antifederalists 
and followers of Jefferson, many of the Framers wanted the judiciary to impede attempts by 
other branches of government to overstep the role authorized by the social contract. Jefferson 
and his followers wanted interpretations of the limits of constitutional power to be determined 
by Congress in the way that such matters were resolved in the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom. 
Protections against factions and other barriers included by the Framers of the 
Constitution have proven insufficient to protect property rights in the United States. Decisions 
regarding the use of resources are often based on political influence rather than the market. 
Judicial solutions have given way to rent-seeking politics. Justices of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, SCOTUS, often decide cases regarding physical and regulatory takings with 
deference to the other branches of government (Wagner 1987). The public choice approach 
provides insight into the process by which this transition has occurred.  
 
United States Constitution 
 The actual text of the United States Constitution and the framework of government that 
it sets out are entirely consistent with Lockean notions of individual rights and representative 
government. While the ultimate power rests with the people, numerous safeguards are 
embedded in the structure of the government and private property garners special protection.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7
  Presenting both sides of the issue using non-academic articles such as the two cited 
above is an especially effective way to stimulate healthy debate in the classroom. Students 
who feel strongly about either side can gather additional information and data from 
government sources, think tanks, or news agencies. Though most students will first consider 
the impact on consumers, it is also helpful to steer the conversation to the candy industry and 
other users of sugar. 
8
  Steel industry arguments for protection include national defense justifications (Gibson 
2017) and serve to further the discussion. For the argument against protections, see Whiting 
and Zissimos (2017). 
9
  Discussion of these ideas may be enhanced by a review of the research on freedom. 
Various indices, often including a measure of property rights, exist in the literature. Measures 
of economic freedom, political freedom, and civil liberties permit comparison and ranking of 
countries or states. Three of the most widely cited indices are produced by the Fraser 
Institute, Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation. Berggren (2003) provides a brief 
description of economic freedom and the implications of policies restricting freedom.  
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Protections Against Factions 
 Madison warned of factions in The Federalist  No. 10 and argued for safeguards 
against the damage they might cause. Various protections were included in the framework of 
government set out in the new United States Constitution to insure against dominance by self-
interested political actors. This new structure set up a government where power was to be 
shared among three separate branches: executive, legislative and judicial. Each branch was 
designed to carry out certain functions, yet relied on the others in various ways. The complex 
system of checks and balances assured that no branch could act unilaterally to take full control 
of the sovereign power. Where the branches could not come to agreement on particular issues, 
the inability to act preserves the status quo, further protecting the rights of the people. 
 To protect the politically weak minority, the Framers included several non-democratic 
elements to reduce the power wielded by the majority. The bicameral design of the legislative 
branch, with Representatives in the House and Senators serving different terms in office, 
assured that some lawmakers would face greater pressure from the electorate. Senators, elected 
indirectly through the state legislatures
10
, would be more insulated and thus able to take a 
longer-term view. The President is also elected indirectly; the Framers set up the Electoral 
College system to diminish the power of the majority.  
 The separation of powers and system of checks and balances further protect the rights 
of the minority from being trampled by restraining the power of the majority to create new 
laws. As both houses of Congress must agree on a bill before it goes before the President, 51 
Senators can stop a bill from becoming law. Once a bill gains the approval of Congress, the 
President then decides whether the Executive will also approve the bill. The Presidential veto 
allows one man to obstruct the will of the majority. Congress can then override the President’s 
veto upon a two-thirds vote in each house.   
 
 Supremacy Clause 
 Though Madison and/or Hamilton
11
 argued in The Federalist No. 51 that the separation 
of powers was essential, the judicial branch was permitted a greater degree of independence so 
that it could curb abuses by the other branches of government. Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 
78 argued that the judiciary must have the power to review legislation because such review 
serves to uphold Constitutional limitations on legislative power. 
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through 
the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts 
contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the 
reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing (230). 
 The Constitution lacks explicit provisions stating that judges are authorized to review 
legislation. Yet, support for judicial review of legislation can be found in Article VI, Paragraph 
2 of the United States Constitution, a section known as the Supremacy Clause: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
                                                 
10
  Since adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 
1913, Senators have been directly elected by the voters. 
11
  Authorship of various Federalist papers has been debated because Madison, Hamilton 
and Jay signed the papers as Publius.  
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Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 78 reasoned that the legislature cannot be presumed to serve 
as judge of its own actions. Judicial review as a check on legislative power necessarily follows 
from the logic of the framework of government laid out in the Constitution.  
It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an 
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other 
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The 
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts (231).  
 The issue of judicial review came before the SCOTUS in Marbury v. Madison (1803). 
The Court found that the Constitution, by its very structure, permitted the Court to declare acts 
of Congress to be unconstitutional. Chief Justice Marshall pointed to the consequences of an 
alternate finding. 
The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited power is 
abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, 
and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. 
 
The Takings Clause 
 The Fifth Amendment, including the Takings Clause, was added after ratification of the 
Constitution in the Bill of Rights. This simple proviso, “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use without just compensation,” clearly indicates that property rights are vested but can 
be removed under certain circumstances, such as situations with high transaction costs.
12
 The 
ambiguity of the circumstances has fostered most of the subsequent debate.  
In circumstances where the existing structure of rights does not fit a new situation, 
rights must be established to assure efficient resource allocation.  This allows for the provision 
of typical Lockean public goods by specifying the limits of government seizure of private 
property. For example, when the state attempts to assemble a contiguous tract of land to build a 
highway, a single holdout property owner may freeze negotiations, jeopardizing the entire 
project.  Takings are generally accepted as necessary to avoid the holdout problem, essentially 
a problem of high transaction costs.  
The work of Ronald Coase
13
 stimulated extensive research on the topic of transaction 
costs. While he generally favored market solutions,
14
 his critics open the door for government 
intervention in markets.  Coase (1960) began with the assumption of zero transaction costs, 
analyzing the outcome where a cattle rancher is fully liable for damage to a neighbor’s crops, 
and then comparing this result to the alternative legal rule of no liability for damage. In the 
absence of transaction costs, negotiations between the farmer and the cattle rancher lead to the 
same allocation of resources regardless of the liability rule, because each is led to incorporate 
the costs and benefits of the proposed bargain into the decision-making process. Later dubbed 
the Coase Theorem, this proposition states that with zero transaction costs, the initial 
                                                 
12
  Transaction costs are all of the costs of carrying out transactions using the pricing 
mechanism of the market. Setting prices, engaging in negotiations, drawing up contracts, 
policing those agreements and settling disputes are costs of transacting in the market. 
13
  Coase (1937) provides his first analysis of transaction costs. Coase (1959) provides a 
more systematic treatment of the issue. Coase (1960) answered critics of his earlier work, 
including many Chicago economists. In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase provided the 
widely-known cattle example and advocated a program of research, inspiring many in the 
field of law and economics.  
14
  Note that Coase is not a Lockean. He does not imply, as Locke does, that first 
possession rights are crucial.  Rather, he argues that property rights must be determined.   
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assignment of property rights will not alter the final allocation of resources, although the 
distribution of income and wealth will differ.  
Coase then demonstrated the central importance of property rights and the pervasive 
nature of transaction costs.   Contractual solutions require clearly defined property rights and 
transaction costs that are lower than expected gains; thus, parties may fail to reach an 
agreement when transaction costs are high or benefits are low.  In these instances, the initial 
allocation of property rights does matter.  The decision of the court may very well be the final 
word in deciding how resources will be used.
15
 Most criticisms of Coase’s research16 relate to 
three basic points: 1) inter-industrial long-term effects; 2) distributional effects; and 3) the 
assumption of zero transaction costs (Parisi, 153).  
 The legal debate goes further into the details of what constitutes a taking and what 
compensation, if any, is required.  Numerous Supreme Court decisions
17
 have wrestled with 
the meaning of “public use” and “just compensation” as well as the subtler questions of partial 
takings and regulatory takings. The judiciary has been called upon to determine the extent of 
property rights under the Takings Clause.  
Given this pivotal role, the independence of the judicial branch is vital to upholding the 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights. If the independence of the judicial branch is compromised, the 
question becomes: will the protection of property rights be litigated entirely in the court system 
or will political pressures determine rights? Rent-seeking will prevail where political influence 
                                                 
15
  An interesting case to discuss with students is Bryant v. Lefever (1879) in which the 
plaintiff brought a nuisance claim after the defendant stacked timber on the roof of his house.  
The plaintiff argued that the timber interfered with the airflow over his house and caused 
smoke to back up in his chimney whenever he lit a fire.  The opinion of the Court of Appeals 
discussed the reciprocal nature of the problem and found in favor of the defendant.  
According to the Coasean perspective, the activities of both parties combined to cause the 
damage.  In the absence of transaction costs, the judicial assignment of rights will not 
determine the final allocation of resources.  Through negotiations, the man who lit the fire 
can pay the man who stacked the timber on his roof to move the timber.  The value of the 
property rights and the negotiated side payments alter the wealth of the two parties.  In this 
case, the defendant becomes wealthier; however, if the judgment had been in favor of the 
plaintiff, he would have been wealthier as a result of negotiations subsequent to the judges’ 
decision.  The critical point to remember is that in the absence of transaction costs the 
assignment of rights will not alter the allocation of resources, but will alter the distribution of 
income and wealth between the parties. 
16
  Research critical of Coase includes Calabresi and Melamed (1972), Cooter (1982) and 
Holmes and Sunstein (1999). Coase (1988) responded to the critics. 
17
  Some cases of interest include: Hadacheck v. Las Vegas (1915); Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon (1922); Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926); Miller v. Shoene 
(1929); Berman v. Parker (1954); Penn Central Transportation Company et. al. v. City of 
New York et. al. (1978); Agins v. Tiburon (1980); Hawaii Housing v. Midkiff (1984); First 
English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, California (1987); Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission (1987); Hodel v. Irving (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Association v. DeBenedictis (1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission (1992); 
Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994); Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. V. Banin (1998); Palazzolo 
v. Rhode Island (R.I. 2000); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002); and Kelo v. City of New London, 
Connecticut (2005).   
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controls the allocation of rights. The shift of emphasis in the federal legal system from a 
Lockean vision to a Hobbesian vision has occurred in many small steps within the various 
branches of the federal government. “It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. 
Slavery has so frightful an aspect to men accustomed to freedom that it must steal upon them 
by degrees and must disguise itself in a thousand shapes in order to be received.” (Hume, 118) 
 
The Executive Branch 
 The Framers of the Constitution envisioned the executive branch to function as a 
controlling device through the veto power. They intended that the President enforce the 
Constitution and laws enacted by Congress. The Framers included several checks on the power 
of the executive, though the protections they bestowed have been reduced over time, making 
the executive branch a much more activist force.  
 Article II of the Constitution lays out the qualifications, election proceedings, powers 
and impeachment measures for the executive branch of the federal government. The President, 
Vice President, and a variety of departments and officers make up the executive branch. 
Ratified in 1804, the Twelfth Amendment changed the election process so that candidates 
clearly run for the office of President or Vice President. Otherwise, the Constitutional basis for 
the power of the executive has remained unaltered.      
 As originally conceived by the Framers, the President operates as a check on the 
legislative power. The President can veto acts of Congress, though Congress may override the 
veto with a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate. The power to veto acts of Congress 
permits the President to assert his political will, counter to the intentions of the Framers. 
President Andrew Jackson was the first president to use the veto power extensively, and many 
presidents who followed him have used the veto power to set the nation’s legislative agenda.  
  Several checks on the power of the executive are included in the Constitution.  The 
President, Vice President and federal judges may be impeached and, if convicted, removed 
from office. The Senate holds the exclusive power to try impeached officials, including the 
President, though only the House of Representatives may vote to file charges of impeachment. 
The Senate must confirm all presidential appointees and ratify treaties.   
 
Pressures on the Executive Branch 
 The key relevance of the executive branch to this study is the power of the President to 
appoint justices to the Supreme Court. This important power is checked by the requirement 
that all nominees undergo a process of advice and consent by the Senate. These powers and the 
declining effectiveness of the constitutional checks leave the executive branch open to various 
pressures.   
 All elected officials face vote pressures, though this pressure is tempered by the 
realities of representative democracy. Since the probability of casting the deciding vote is tiny, 
individual voters do not gather the necessary information about the candidates to make an 
informed decision. Many realize that their vote will not decide the election and rationally 
choose to abstain from the costly act of voting at all. Those who do show up at the polls, 
perhaps out of a sense of civic duty, are ignorant of much of the information necessary to make 
a truly informed decision.   
 The Constitution specifies that voters do not elect the President directly; rather, the 
President is elected indirectly through the Electoral College. The presidential election is a very 
high profile election and voters are more likely to gather information about presidential 
candidates. Still, the indirect nature of the vote for President and the minuscule chance of 
casting the decisive vote in a national election combine to reduce the effort of voters in 
gathering information.   
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 The vacuum created by rational ignorance and rational abstention is filled by well-
organized interest groups who lobby the candidates (Olson 1965). These groups pressure 
politicians to support policy changes that will favor the members of the interest group. 
Campaign contributions and endorsements are traded for promises. While the benefits of 
policy are concentrated to serve a select few among the members of the interest group, the 
costs of providing those benefits will be spread among the broader electorate, who remain 
rationally ignorant. The most effective interest groups will be those small groups that are able 
to avoid the free rider problems associated with political benefits that often have public 
characteristics (Ekelund and Tollison 2001). 
 Once elected, the President can make good on his promises by filling vacancies on the 
Supreme Court with justices who support the ideological and political goals of his political 
supporters. Within the Federal court system, the appointments process is an inherently political 
process. Interest groups will exert direct pressure on the executive branch in an attempt to 
influence Supreme Court nominations.   
 As sitting members resign, retire or die, vacancies on the bench must be filled by the 
President. The President nominates judges to fill the positions of justices or chief justice. The 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides over meetings and assigns the writing of opinions. 
This position carries with it the ability to significantly shape the direction of the Court. For 
example, the Marshall Court, 1801-1835, under Chief Justice John Marshall greatly enhanced 
federal power at the expense of states’ rights. Thus, elevating a sitting justice or appointing a 
chief justice enables the President to have a substantial impact on the Court.   
 Although no qualifications for justices are laid out in the Constitution, one would 
expect nomination based on competence and ethics; however, it is clear that ideology, political 
support, and political activism also play a role. If the President is popular and the Senate is 
controlled by his party, the President enjoys great leeway in his selection of nominees for the 
bench. When circumstances are less favorable, the President may opt to nominate those who 
appear harmless to the political constituencies of the majority party. The American Bar 
Association weighs in on the suitability of the President’s nominees. The ABA tends to favor 
judicial activism on civil rights issues and restraint on issues involving economic rights, 
positions that cause some writers to perceive the ABA as left-leaning.  
 
The Legislative Branch 
 Article I of the Constitution sets out the framework, powers and many of the 
procedures of the legislative branch. Consisting of a bicameral Congress, the legislature is the 
law-making branch of the federal government. The House of Representatives holds the sole 
power to propose bills for raising revenue and can vote on charges of impeachment. The 
Senate exclusively has the power to ratify treaties, try impeached officials, and confirm 
presidential appointees.   
 Various amendments to the Constitution have directly impacted the legislative branch. 
The Fourteenth Amendment established rules for the apportioning of representatives in 
Congress to states. The Sixteenth Amendment authorized Congress to levy federal taxes on 
income. The Seventeenth Amendment established direct election of senators and the Twentieth 
Amendment changed the day Congress convenes.   
 The system of checks and balances works to rein in the legislature as well as the other 
branches of the federal government. Congress may impeach federal officers, including the 
President, Vice President, and federal judges. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides 
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over the trial and a conviction requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate.
18
 The President can 
veto any legislation passed by both houses of Congress; however, Congress can override the 
President’s veto with a two-thirds vote.   
 
Pressures on the Legislative Branch 
 The key relevance of the legislative branch to this study lies in its powers to make law 
and the role of the Senate in the appointment of justices to the Supreme Court. Statutes enacted 
by Congress could be within or outside the confines of the Constitution. The House plays no 
role in the appointment process. The appointment process for presidential nominees to the 
Supreme Court gives the Senate great sway over the makeup of the Court. These opportunities 
to play politics leave the legislative branch open to many pressures.   
 Members of Congress face pressure to satisfy voters to ensure reelection; however, 
rational ignorance moderates the effect of direct elections. House Representatives face election 
every two years while one-third of all Senators are elected every two years for six-year terms. 
While most voters know the names of the presidential candidates, fewer know the names, let 
alone the policy positions, of the various men and women who run for Congress.   
 Various interest groups step in to pressure candidates to adopt policy positions 
favorable to the members of the group. Campaign contributions and direct advertising on 
behalf of candidates help to ensure that the candidate will win the election. Once elected, the 
politician repays the group by supporting policies that favor the members of the interest group. 
By directly influencing some of the major players in the Senate confirmation proceedings, 
interest groups are able to indirectly influence the members of the Court and other presidential 
appointments.       
 
The Judicial Branch 
 Article III of the Constitution suggests a simple framework for the judiciary by 
providing that “(t)he judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The 
Constitution also contains several provisions intended to protect the independence of the 
judiciary. Supreme Court justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 
Once confirmed by the Senate, justices serve for life, barring resignation or impeachment. 
Also, the salary of a justice cannot be reduced during his or her time in office to prevent the 
legislature from imposing financial penalties on individual justices.     
 
The Role of Justices  
The structure of the judicial branch, as originally incorporated into the Constitution, 
was designed by many of the Framers to protect the Constitution from the executive and 
                                                 
18
  To date, the House has initiated impeachment proceedings 62 times, though only 
seventeen federal officers have been impeached. Only two presidents, Andrew Johnson and 
William Jefferson Clinton, have been impeached and both were acquitted by the Senate. One 
cabinet officer, William W. Belknap, the Secretary of War, resigned before his trial. Senator 
William Blount was impeached even though the Senate had already expelled him. Associate 
Justice Samuel Chase was acquitted. Twelve other federal judges have been impeached, 
including Alcee Hastings who was convicted for taking a bribe and later won election to the 
House of Representatives. The House Judiciary Committee approved articles of impeachment 
against President Richard Nixon, but he resigned prior to House consideration of the 
impeachment resolution. 
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legislative branches. Judicial deference to the legislative or executive branches of government 
weakens the system of checks and balances. Decisions handed down by the SCOTUS 
increasingly depend on the identity of Justices appointed to the Supreme Court and their 
judicial philosophy regarding the role of justices.  
 Aside from general provisions regarding jurisdiction, the text of the Constitution is 
silent regarding the practical functioning of the Supreme Court. Specifically, the text of the 
Constitution is ambiguous regarding the role of justices, leaving this decision to be made, at 
least in part, by the justices themselves. Some assistance with this difficult question can be 
found, however, in The Federalist No. 78. There, Hamilton provided specific guidance for 
judicial review of legislation. 
A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental 
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning 
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen 
to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior 
obligation and validity ought of course to be preferred; or in other words, the 
constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the 
intention of their agents (231). 
Thus, the Framers firmly advocated the Lockean notion that the supreme power rests with the 
people and the Constitution should be favored over other inferior sources of law. The 
independence of the judiciary was to be protected to ensure that the rights of the people were 
protected from the other branches of government. 
 In practice, the ambiguity of the Constitution with regard to the functioning of the 
Court and the independence it provides the Court may serve to increase political activism. 
Justices must decide their own stance as regards the meaning of their sworn oath to uphold the 
Constitution and the means by which they will implement that pledge. Though legislators 
initiate and enact legislation, the Court can review that legislation and strike it down if they 
find that it violates the Constitution. Justices on the Court have a range of alternatives. At one 
extreme is unconstrained activism where justices make whatever rules they wish. Absolute 
judicial restraint, at the other extreme, leads justices to always accede to the legislature.   
 Under the doctrine of judicial review, justices have taken varied approaches generally 
and many have taken different approaches on the many issues that they are asked to consider. 
Some argue that the courts should actively monitor the legislature to discover and strike down 
infringements on the Constitution by the legislature. This judicial activism is justified as 
necessary to protect the rights of individuals. Others favor judicial restraint, arguing that the 
courts should show deference to the legislature as the representative of the people. Judicial 
pragmatism suggests that there should be no general presumption in favor of the courts or the 
legislature; rather, a pragmatic decision regarding the specific circumstances should allow 
justices to determine the best way to achieve principled objectives.   
 Each of these approaches has significant weaknesses. Unconstrained activist justices 
are likely to be guided by their personal political agendas and spurred on by the dominant 
special interest groups. On the other hand, absolute judicial restraint leaves individual rights 
vulnerable because of the rational ignorance of the electorate, ideological pressures within the 
legislature, vote trading and logrolling by minority factions. The ad hoc middle ground 
approach employed by judicial pragmatists leaves the courts and the legislature open to being 
used to achieve objectives that the other could not accomplish.      
 The two sides of this debate differ greatly in their views of the Constitutional text and 
the implications for judicial review of legislation. On one side of the debate are those who 
argue that several of the words used in the Constitution, in practice, have no fixed meaning. 
They contend that, as circumstances change within society, the meanings of words change. 
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This skepticism forms the basis of the notion that words must be reinterpreted by each 
successive generation in an effort to determine the meaning of the “Living Constitution”.  
 On the other side of the dispute are those who call for a strict constructionist approach 
to the text of the Constitution and judicial review. Strict construction, in general, requires that 
justices base their decisions on the actual wording of the Constitution and the notes and 
interpretations surrounding it. And, justices are not bound by precedent which derives from 
judgments based on judicial activism, restraint or pragmatism. Justices are permitted to make 
law from the bench only where the Constitution is silent regarding a particular issue and even 
then, in cases of particular importance, amending the Constitution is preferable.   
 There is a fundamental tension between the two competing notions that underlie these 
different approaches. The notion that the Constitution leaves the ultimate sovereign authority 
with the people, and their representatives by proxy, is in direct opposition to the notion that the 
courts make the final determination under the doctrine of judicial review. Proponents of the 
doctrine of judicial review argue that the independence of justices allows them to better 
interpret the law because they are insulated from normal political pressures. This allows 
justices to protect the Constitution in times of strife, such as war and economic disaster.   
 The opponents of judicial review argue that the hands of legislators in office should not 
be tied by the Framers. Also, they contend that judicial review separates principles from 
politics and leads to a decline in the sense of moral responsibility among the public. They fear 
that justices, left free to question legislators, will impose their own views about the proper 
ordering of society, on the pretense that they are consistent with the views of the Framers.    
 These views are most at odds where the Constitution is particularly vague or silent. The 
unavoidable discretion necessary in these situations opens the door for justices to force society 
to conform to their preferred social ideals. The crux of the debate on this topic centers on 
whether judicial discretion in the review of legislation should be constrained by current views 
of justice, the Framers’ intent, or even the Constitution itself.   
 Interpretation of the United States Constitution is a source of heated debate even 
among those who call for strict construction. An attempt to apply the precise wording of the 
Constitution leads to an endless play on words. Strict construction by a precise reading of 
words is actually quite difficult because words have changed meaning. It would be necessary 
to go back to the eighteenth century meaning of individual terms, a prospect that may only 
increase the debate rather than resolve it. 
 An alternative approach to strict construction calls for justices to construe the 
Constitution in accordance with the original spirit of the Constitution. It is clear in Madison’s 
later papers that the text of the Constitution is preferred as having authority over even the 
debates of the Framers; yet, remaining doubt must be resolved by looking to meaning attached 
to it by the people. 
 As a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, 
the debates and incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative 
character. However desirable it be that they should be preserved as a gratification 
to the laudable curiosity felt by every people to trace the origin and progress of 
their political Institutions, & as a source perhaps of some lights on the Science of 
Govt. the legitimate meaning of the Instrument must be derived from the text 
itself; or if a key is to be sought elsewhere, it must be not in the opinions or 
intentions of the Body which planned & proposed the Constitution, but in the 
sense attached to it by the people in their respective State Conventions where it 
recd. all the Authority which it possesses (Madison 1821). 
Madison, together with Hamilton, greatly influenced the debate over the ratification of the 
Constitution in The Federalist Papers and that debate sheds light on the ideas and 
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understanding of the people at the time of ratification. In the shadow of the American 
Revolution, the people wished to protect their rights, not least the right to property, against a 
despotic government.   
 Madison, in his earlier papers, had provided his understanding of the proper role of 
government with respect to the people in general and their property in particular. “Government 
is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of 
individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of government, 
that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own 
(Madison 1792)”. If the Constitution is to be meaningful, it must be strictly construed to 
comply with the spirit in which it was ratified.   
 In the context of the takings debate, Epstein (1985) rejects calls for linguistic 
skepticism and advocates the ordinary usage definition of “private property” as necessary not 
only to protect property, but also to maintain the rule of law (20-24). Epstein supports his 
argument by pointing to the definition employed by Blackstone, for whom “the right of 
property (is) that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe” (22). Blackstone and Locke, each who deemed the protection of private property as 
crucial, had a strong influence on the Framers and the understanding of the people at the time 
of ratification. Thus, Epstein argues that “greater progress will be made by assuming that the 
clause is designed to do what it says, namely to ensure that private property is not taken for 
public use without just compensation,”(26) in accordance with the spirit in which it was 
ratified by the people. 
 
Pressures on the Judicial Branch 
 The key relevance of the judicial branch to this discussion lies in its ability to check the 
power of the other branches of government as it carries out its duty to uphold the Constitution. 
While the judicial philosophy of an individual justice may impede or promote political 
activism, justices face additional pressure from a variety of sources. The efficacy of the 
Constitutional provisions aimed at reining in the power of the judiciary has eroded in the face 
of these pressures.   
 The Constitution includes several checks on judicial power; however, some have only 
limited practical significance. The possible exertion of judicial power alters the incentives 
faced during nomination by the executive and the process of Senatorial advice and consent. 
Once in office, justices are protected from retribution by the other branches of government, 
though not perfectly.    
 The Court faces pressure because of the ambiguity of the Constitution regarding the 
structure of the federal courts. For example, the number of justices on the Supreme Court has 
varied over time. Established in 1789, the Supreme Court originally consisted of six justices; 
however, at one point after the Civil War, there were ten justices on the Court. Since 1869, 
there have been nine justices on the Court, though President Franklin D. Roosevelt made an 
attempt to increase the number in 1937. The Roosevelt administration made an overt attempt to 
pressure the Court to support the New Deal. The majority leader of the Senate, Joseph 
Robinson, apparently gathered enough votes to pass a Court packing bill, despite the 
disapproval of the Senate Judiciary Committee, but he died before the bill came up for a vote, 
and the bill died also.   
 Within the political system, the separation of powers and the role of the legislature vis-
à-vis the judiciary becomes a political factor. To reduce the power of the Court, Congress 
could attempt to restrict the jurisdiction of the Court or adopt constitutional amendments. 
Congress and the President, working together, could attempt to reconstitute the Court as seats 
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come open. While all Supreme Court hopefuls face substantial inquiry during confirmation 
hearings, for some nominees the media circus surrounding the hearings can be staggering. 
While the attention is politically motivated, the life tenure of the position and range of issues 
that may come before the nominee justify the level of scrutiny and rigor of the proceedings.   
 Congressional pressure can also be exerted through financial appropriations. Although 
Congress is unable to reduce the nominal salaries of justices, its failure to raise salaries during 
inflationary times operates as a real wage decrease. In fact, salaries have not kept up with 
inflation and certainly do not compete with the opportunities available for highly skilled 
attorneys in private practice. Congress also holds the purse strings for funding of perks 
associated with office and even support services.   
 In one simple way, the power of the judiciary is constrained procedurally. Supreme 
Court justices are restricted to deciding the cases that come before the Court, thus limiting 
justices to a reactive role with limited ability to establish an agenda for political activism. 
Although they are a small portion of the cases heard by the Court, class action lawsuits brought 
by interest groups provide opportunities for willing justices to render decisions on politically 
charged issues. As the number of cases increases, so does the degree of judicial activism. The 
sheer numbers of lawsuits provide many occasions for justices to rule on their issues of choice. 
To compensate for the increasing caseload, justices rely more heavily on staff in the selection 
of cases and the preparation of documents they will draw upon to reach a decision. 
 Interest group pressures are another important factor. Interest groups will attempt to 
influence nominations and confirmations, often indirectly as these groups impact elections for 
the President and Senators, which make up the key players in the process. Interest groups may 
also attempt to intimidate justices through media attention on the deliberations of the Court or 
implicit threats of civil disobedience in the event of decisions unfavorable to their cause. These 
tactics should not sway an independent judiciary, though they are effective in some instances.   
 The desire for respect and a quiet life can be a powerful influence on the decisions of 
individual justices. These majoritarian pressures are precisely the danger warned against by 
Madison in The Federalist No. 10. Epstein (1985) recommends a principled solution:  
If the power of the judges is to be legitimated, they cannot be just another political 
organ of government. As they cannot appeal to popular will, they must be able to 
provide authoritative interpretations of the constitutional text that are not simply 
manifestations of their own private beliefs about what legislation should 
accomplish. In order for judges to make principled interpretations, the language of 
the Constitution must be precise enough to bind even those who disagree with 
what it says, for the mission of constitutional government must soon founder if 
judges can decide cases as freely with the Constitution in place as without it (19-
20).   
 
Conclusion 
 This paper has outlined a way for instructors to lead discussion of property rights and 
the public choice pressures on the various players in the U.S. Federal system within the 
Hobbes versus Locke framework. Currently, the U.S. federal system is a mixture of these 
approaches and there is an increasing shift toward a Hobbesian based system. The 
Constitutional provisions designed to protect property rights have proven insufficient to protect 
property rights in the United States. Property owners have been stripped of rights through 
physical and regulatory takings decisions handed down by the SCOTUS. Public choice 
pressures on the various players in the US federal system provide insight into the process by 
which this has occurred. Property rights increasingly derive from the sovereign as Justices of 
the SCOTUS decide cases regarding physical and regulatory takings with deference to the 
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other branches of government. Decisions regarding the use of resources are based on political 
influence rather than the market as judicial solutions have given way to rent-seeking politics.  
 This transition provides substantial material for classroom debate. Further class 
discussions or a term paper assignment could require students to analyze landmark cases that 
have impacted property rights, specific laws or policies that restrict property rights or historical 
instances of direct political pressure on the Court, such as FDR’s attempt to pack the Court. 
The interdisciplinary nature of the discussion encourages input from students with a broad 
range of backgrounds and interests. Students majoring in economics, as well as political 
science, history, general business, pre-law and philosophy respond well to this line of 
discussion, making this framework especially well-suited to use in an upper division elective 
with limited pre-requisites. Takings remains a controversial issue analyzed by many scholars, 
including several public choice scholars.
19
 Their work can be included to prepare for teaching 
in this area or to build a syllabus for a full semester course.  
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